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RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION COSTS: WHO
PAYS AND HOW MUCH?
Paul Vercruyssen*
Abstract: Over the past decade major public policy concerns over the
environment, national security, the economy, and climate change have
converged, creating significant pressure to reform America’s energy system. The
result has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable energy sources
with growth only expected to accelerate. This new development represents a
radical shift for a nation whose electricity system was built to run on fossil fuels
and hydroelectric dams. The electricity grid is a complex interconnected system
requiring constant balancing of supply and demand. Using new intermittent
technologies like solar and wind requires changes in grid management to
maintain a constant energy balance in real-time. This comment analyzes
proposed solutions for the integration of renewable resources into the electricity
grid, and the legal and regulatory steps required to achieve this integration.
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I.

RENEWABLE INTEGRATION OVERVIEW

Over the past decade major public policy concerns including
air pollution and climate change have converged, creating
significant pressure to reform America’s energy system.1 The
result has been a tremendous increase in the use of renewable
energy sources with growth only expected to accelerate.2
Looking to the future, President Obama recently set a goal for
the United States to derive 85% of its electricity from clean
energy sources.3 These developments represent radical shifts
for a nation whose electricity system was built to run on fossil
fuels and hydroelectric dams.4 Incumbent technologies should
not be expected to yield ground willingly, and these changes
will not come without growing pains. Advocates for renewable
technologies have long complained of numerous obstacles that
tilt the playing field in favor of conventional technologies. Over

* J.D., University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2011.
1. See, e.g., Kelsey Jae Nunez, Gridlock on the Road to Renewable Energy
Development: A Discussion About the Opportunities & Risks Presented by the
Modernization Requirements of the Electricity Transmission Network, 1 J. BUS.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 137, 141-154 (2007).
2. U.N. Envtl. Programme, Bloomberg New Energy Finance, Global Trends in
Sustainable Energy Finance, 22, ISBN 978-92-807-3085-2 (2010) [hereinafter UNEP
Report], available at http://sefi.unep.org/fileadmin/media/sefi/docs/publications/
UNEP_GTR_2010.pdf.
3. Address Before a Joint Session of Congress on the State of the Union, DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 201100047 (Jan. 25, 2011) available at http://www.gpo.gov/
fdsys/pkg/DCPD-201100047/pdf/DCPD-201100047.pdf.
4. Darrell Blakeway & Carol Brotman White, Tapping the Power of Wind: FERC
Initiatives to Facilitate Transmission of Wind Power, 26 ENERGY L.J. 393, 412 (2005).
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time different obstacles have been removed and new obstacles
have arisen.5
This is not the first time that incumbents in the electric
power industry have felt pressure from new market
participants. Most electric companies in the United States
began as private enterprises seeking to monopolize this new
market for electricity, focusing the services on dense urban
populations. Bringing the power to the people took the
intervention of the government. Major federal projects like the
Bonneville Power Administration and legislation like the
Rural Electrification Act reshaped the face of the nation by
bringing electricity to places that the incumbent private
utilities were not willing to tread.6 To build an electric system
which includes significant amounts of renewable energy will
require comparable changes in our electricity system. Public
policies currently being discussed can determine the success or
failure of the renewable power industry.
The electricity grid is a complex interconnected system
requiring constant balancing of supply and demand.7 Using
new intermittent technologies like solar and wind requires
changes in grid management to maintain a constant energy
balance in real-time. As more intermittent renewable
resources have come onto the electricity grid, transmission
operators have struggled to integrate the variability of these
resources with existing conventional technologies. This
comment analyzes proposed solutions for the integration of
renewable variable energy resources (VER) into the electricity
grid, and the legal and regulatory steps required to achieve
this integration.
5. See, e.g., James A. Holtkamp & Mark A. Davidson, Transmission Siting in the
Western United States: Getting Green Electrons to Market, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 379
(2010); see also Nunez, supra note 1.
6. Bonneville Project Act of 1937, 16 U.S.C. § 832 (2011); Rural Electrification Act of
1936, 7 U.S.C. § 901 et seq. (2011); see also Robert M. Greening, Jr., Bonneville Power
Administration’s Preference Customers Meet the Northwest Power Act, 13 ENVTL. L.
809, 823 (1983) (discussing the impact of public preference policies on bringing electric
service to customers across the Pacific Northwest).
7. Steven Ferrey, Restructuring A Green Grid: Legal Challenges to Accommodate
New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 985-987 (2009); see also
Andrew Howe, Dynamic Response Could Do Away with Costly Balancing Capacity,
Utility Week, Sept. 24, 2008 available at http://www.utilityweek.co.uk/news/
news_story.asp?id=39227&title=Dynamic+demand+response+could+do+away+with+co
stly+balancing+capacity (discussing the challenges of balancing supply and demand
within the energy grid).
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Many ideas have been proposed for integrating renewable
energy into the grid, and some have been implemented, but the
policy debate continues. Most recently, the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) proposed a series of rules to
level the playing field for renewable energy grid integration.8
While FERC’s proposals are an improvement over the existing
state of affairs, they do not go far enough to ensure the longterm success of emerging renewable energy technologies.
This comment begins with the assumption that the various
renewable energy goals set out by the federal government and
numerous states are essential for achieving a number of
environmental, economic, national security, and climate
change policy objectives. The changes required to integrate
renewable energy into the grid will have costs associated with
them. When assessing FERC’s Proposed Rule and other
renewable integration policy proposals, this comment’s
primary concern will be how the burdens of integration are
distributed. Because growth in renewable energy is an
essential part of so many policy goals, the costs of achieving
those goals should be distributed equitably. Renewables should
be allowed to compete on a level playing field rather than one
designed to favor incumbent electricity generation
technologies.
To understand the motivation behind renewable energy
development, Part II provides an overview of the problems
renewable energy is meant to address and the policies
encouraging its growth. Part III describes the obstacles faced
by renewable energy resources when integrating with the
existing electricity grid. Part IV outlines the general legal
framework within which the problem of renewable integration
must be resolved. Recent developments have focused attention
on renewable integration and these events are discussed in
Part V. Finally, Part VI offers a critique of the latest Proposed
Rule on renewable integration from FERC. The article
concludes that many elements of FERC’s proposal will address
shortcomings in the current energy regulatory structure, but
the Proposed Rule fails to take on many of the biggest issues
facing renewables and the energy system as a whole.

8. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, 133 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,149 (Nov. 18, 2010)
[hereinafter FERC Proposed Rule].
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II.

KEY DRIVERS BEHIND THE GROWTH OF
RENEWABLE ENERGY

A.

Policy Goals to be Achieved Through Growth in Renewable
Energy

Renewable technologies such as wind and solar account for
an ever-increasing portion of our electric power production.
From 2004 to 2008, the amount of electricity generated in the
United States by wind and solar resources nearly quadrupled.9
However, this renewable energy mix still makes up only a
small percentage of overall U.S. electricity generation.10 Six
policy goals have been outlined as the key drivers of the
renewable energy growth over the past decade: 1) growth in
energy demand; 2) climate change; 3) environmental benefits;
4) energy costs; 5) economic revitalization and job creation; and
6) energy security.11
The demand for electricity in the United States is only
expected to increase in the coming decades. Assuming
electricity consumption continues to grow at current rates,
rising demand will require almost 300 gigawatts of new
electricity capacity in the United States by 2030.12 The impacts
from growth in energy demand are not specific to the
renewable energy sectors. Absent other factors, growth in
energy demand will drive development across the spectrum of
different types of generation technologies. Policies encouraging
the growth in renewable energy create more ways to meet
increasing energy needs.
When discussing the need for renewable energy, most
attention focuses on climate change. Most climate scientists
9. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Renewable Energy Consumption for Electricity
Generation by Energy Use Sector and Energy Source, 2004 – 2008 (August 2010)
available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/solar.renewables/page/trends/table1_3.pdf
(calculating the 2008 output of wind and solar energy for the electric sector (.555
quadrillion Btu) divided by the 2004 output (.148) resulting in a ratio of 3.75).
10. Press Release, U.S. Energy Info. Admin, Renewable Energy Consumption and
Electricity
Preliminary
Statistics
2009
(Aug.
2010)
available
at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/alternate/page/renew_energy_consump/rea_prereport.ht
ml (stating that renewable energy only made up 8% of overall us electricity
consumption in 2009).
11. Nunez, supra note 1, at 141.
12. Worldwatch Institute, The Outlook on Renewable Energy in America 16 (2007)
[hereinafter Worldwatch Report], available at http://www.acore.org/files/RECAP/docs/
OutlookonRenewableEnergy2007.pdf.
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are in agreement that increasing levels of greenhouse gases
are likely to trigger major climate effects including the
disappearance of the Greenland ice cap or even a mass
extinction.13 Further development of renewable energy
technologies that generate little or no carbon represent an
important path for mitigating the impact of climate change.14
Closely related to climate change goals are other
environmental benefits derived from renewable energy.
Pollution from fossil fuel electricity generation causes smog,
particulate pollution, acid precipitation and other air toxins.15
The need for clean energy alternatives is greatest in populated
urban areas where these pollution problems are most acute.16
Clean technologies can replace power plants near population
centers where they are most harmful to humans.
Energy costs have become another significant concern of
policy makers. With international energy demand only
expected to increase, upward pressure on fossil fuel prices will
likely continue.17 Constraints have hit individual consumers in
tangible ways as prices for gasoline and heating oil have seen
intense volatility over the past five years.18 This has translated
into significant new investment in the renewable energy sector
in search of fuels that are insulated from the volatility of
global commodity markets.19
Large-scale renewable generation has the potential to
13. Anthony D. Barnosky, Has the Earth’s Sixth Mass Extinction Already Arrived?,
471 NATURE 51-57, Mar. 3, 2011; see also Robert H. Socolow & Stephen W. Pacala, A
Plan to Keep Carbon in Check, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept. 2006, at 50; see also
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2007: The Physical
Science
Basics-Summary
for
Policy
Makers
(2007),
available
at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf.
14. Daniel M. Kammen, The Rise of Renewable Energy, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Sept.
2006 at 85.
15. Karl R. Rabago, A Strategy for Developing Stationary Biodiesel Generation, 36
CUMB. L. REV. 461, 463-64 (2006).
16. Id.
17. See generally U.S. Energy Info. Admin, World Energy Demand and Economic
Outlook 2010 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/ieo/world.html.
18. Jad Mouawad, Swings in Price of Oil Hobble Forecasting, N.Y. TIMES, July 5,
2009, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/06/business/
06oil.html?_r=1&hp; See also Floyd Norris, Off the Charts: Weathering Gas Price
Volatility, N.Y. TIMES, March 10, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/
03/10/business/worldbusiness/10iht-wbmarket11.html?scp=1&sq=natural%20gas
%20price%20volatility&st=Search.
19. UNEP Report, supra note 2, at 11.
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reinvigorate struggling economies across the U.S.20 Most wind
and solar farms are located in remote rural portions of the
United States. Increased demand for renewable energy will
multiply the number of these farms, which will increase jobs
and create value for this rural land. The significance of this
potential reinvigoration of rural economies is magnified by
findings that renewable energy development creates more jobs
per megawatt than fossil fuel energy technologies.21 This
increased economic activity also increases the tax base for local
governments at a time when many are in desperate need of
new revenue.22
Finally, renewable energy policies are driven by the goal of a
more secure energy supply for the United States. Energy
security has been defined as “having energy services when
they are needed, under acceptable terms and conditions, and
without fear of unexpected interruption.”23 Of great concern is
America’s dependence on foreign oil, which ties us to unstable
and undemocratic nations around the world.24 Renewables can
address this problem by providing energy to power electric
transportation with no fuel costs subject to the fluctuations of
international markets. These policy goals have stimulated
significant governmental action to encourage renewable energy
development with varying degrees of success.
B.

Government Programs Encourage Renewable Energy
Over the past decade the renewable energy sector has been

20. Nunez, supra note 1, at 143-144.
21. See generally Daniel Kammen, Kamal Kapadia, & Matthias Fripp, Putting
Renewables to Work: How Many Jobs Can the Clean Energy Industry Create?, UC
BERKELEY: RENEWABLE AND APPROPRIATE ENERGY LABORATORY (RAEL), April 2004
(updated January 2006), available at http://rael.berkeley.edu/files/2004/KammenRenewable-Jobs-2004.pdf; see also Peter Meisen & Trevor Erberich, Renewable Energy
on Tribal Lands, Global Energy Network Institute 27-28, available at
http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/renewable-energy-on-triballands/Renewable-Energy-on-Tribal-Lands.pdf (explaining the obstacles and potential
benefits of renewable energy development on tribal lands in the U.S.).
22. Verne G. Kopytoff, Amazon Pressured on Sales Tax, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2011,
at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/14/technology/14amazon.html
?_r=1&scp=1&sq=state%20government%20revenue&st=cse (explaining that across the
country state officials are struggling with budget shortfalls and looking for new
sources of revenue).
23. Rabago, supra note 15, at 464.
24. Worldwatch Report, supra note 12, at 8.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011

7

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

188 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1

the beneficiary of countless development programs.25 The
policies with the greatest impact fall in two categories: federal
tax incentives and state renewable portfolio standards.
Originally, the primary federal tax incentive for large wind
energy projects had been a production tax credit.26 Wind
developers received a tax credit of 2.2 cents per kilowatt hour
of energy produced.27 Alternatively, solar technologies were
eligible for an investment tax credit worth 30% of project
expenditures.28
The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(Stimulus) substantially modified the tax incentives adding
additional options for developers of large renewable energy
projects.29 The Stimulus gives developers of wind and solar the
choice of using an investment tax credit or a production tax
credit.30 In addition, the Stimulus authorized the Treasury to
issue cash grants in lieu of the tax credits.31 The various
choices allow each project developer to elect the incentive that
best suits the specific circumstances of their project.32
To supplement the federal incentives, 29 states have
adopted renewable portfolio standards (RPS).33 Generally, an

25. See, e.g., Database of State Incentives for Renewable Energy,
http://www.dsireusa.org/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter DSIRE]. DSIRE is a
comprehensive database compiling all state and federal incentive programs relating to
clean energy and energy efficiency administered by North Carolina State University in
cooperation with federal energy agencies.
26. 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2011).
27. Internal Revenue Serv., Form 8835 (2010), available at http://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/f8835.pdf; see also DSIRE, Renewable Energy Production Tax Credit (last
visited Mar. 3, 2011), http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_
Code=US13F&re=1&ee=1.
28. 26 U.S.C. § 48; see also DSIRE, Business Energy Investment Tax Credit,
http://www.dsireusa.org/incentives/incentive.cfm?Incentive_Code=US02F (last visited
Mar. 3, 2011).
29. 26 U.S.C. §§ 45, 48 (2011).
30. Id.
31. See Id. § 48(d).
32. See generally Mark Bolinger, Ryan Wiser, Karlynn Cory, & Ted James, PTC,
ITC, or Cash Grant? An Analysis of the Choices Facing Power Projects in the United
States, ERNESTO ORLANDO LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL LABORATORY (2009),
available at http://eetd.lbl.gov/EA/EMP/reports/lbnl-1642e.pdf
(discussing the
considerations in choosing which incentive structure to elect for renewable energy
developers).
33. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 25740 et seq. (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.285
(2011); OR. REV. STAT. § 469A; NEV. REV. STAT. § 704.7801 et seq. (2011); ARIZ. ADMIN.
CODE § R14-2-1801 et seq. (2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 69-3-2001 et seq. (2011); COL.
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RPS requires utility generation portfolios to be composed of a
specified minimum amount of clean energy generation. States
have different eligibility requirements and many allow nonrenewable technologies such as advanced coal and nuclear
generation to account for energy goals.34 However, wind and
solar energy have benefitted greatly from these state policies.
For example, Texas has installed more than 9,000 MW of wind
capacity since the state RPS was amended in 2005.35 Likewise,
in the second half of 2010 the California Energy Commission
licensed over 4,100 MW of large-scale solar power, which will
be used to meet the state’s Renewables Portfolio Standard.36
These primary policies are supplemented by a host of
constantly changing federal and state programs that are
designed to achieve the various policy goals served by growth
in renewable energy.37
III. UNDERSTANDING THE OBSTACLES
A.

Renewables Impact the Ability of Regulated Entities to
Meet Reliability Requirements

The characteristics of energy output from renewable
resources are fundamentally different from the traditional
technologies that energy system operators are accustomed to.
Wind and solar energy are classified as VERs because the
availability of the fuel source is not as predictable as
conventional thermal power plants.38 FERC has proposed to

REV. STAT. § 40-2-124 (2011); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 62-15-34, 62-16-4 (2011); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 66-1256 et seq. (2011); TEXAS UTILITIES CODE § 39.904; See generally DSIRE,
supra note 25.
34. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4928.64 et seq. (West 2011) (including clean
coal, coal bed methane, and advanced nuclear as technologies eligible to meet the Ohio
Alternative Energy Resource Standard).
35. Wind Powering America, Installed Wind Capacity by State, 1999-2009, available
at
http://www.windpoweringamerica.gov/docs/installed_wind_capacity_by_state.xls
(last updated Feb. 4, 2010).
36. Press Release, California Energy Commission, CA Energy Commission Approves
650 MW of Solar Power in California Desert (December 15, 2010), available at
http://www.energy.ca.gov/releases/2010_releases/2010-12-15_Approval_palen+rice_
NR.html.
37. See DSIRE, supra note 25 (providing a comprehensive collection of renewable
energy policies).
38. See NERC, Special Report: Accommodating High Levels of Variable Generation
40 (2009) [hereinafter NERC Report], available at http://www.nerc.com/files/IVGTF_
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define a VER as, “. . .a device for the production of electricity
that is characterized by an energy source that: (1) is
renewable; (2) cannot be stored by the facility owner or
operator; and (3) has variability that is beyond the control of
the facility owner or operator.”39 Because the energy from
these plants generally cannot be dispatched unless the wind is
blowing or the sun is shining, utilities have a more difficult
task when conducting resource planning to meet regulatory
requirements.40
To maintain a reliable electricity grid, FERC adopted a rule
incorporating into federal regulation the reliability standards
from the North American Electric Reliability Corporation
(NERC).41 NERC is a self-regulating organization striving for a
reliable power system through development and enforcement
of system reliability standards and assessment of resource
adequacy. 42 NERC is also subject to oversight from FERC.43
NERC enforces these reliability standards upon balancing
authorities (BAs). BAs are the entities responsible for
providing the minute-to-minute reliable operation of the power
system by continuously matching the supply of electricity with
the demand and ensuring sufficient supply capacity for future
hours.44 These reliability requirements are generally applied
within defined balancing authority areas of various sizes.45
Within a given balancing authority area there may be other
system operators such as transmission operators or generators
that are also responsible for controlling elements of the electric
system.46 Transmission operators, and often electric utility

Report_041609.pdf.
39. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 64.
40. See NERC Report, supra note 38, at 2.
41. See Mandatory Reliability Standards for the Bulk Power System, 18 C.F.R. §
40.1–40.3 (2011); see also Report of the Electricity Regulation Committee, 28 ENERGY
L.J. 267, 304–05 (2007).
42. See NERC Report, supra note 38, at 2.
43. Id.
44. NERC, Glossary of Terms Used in Reliability Standards (February 12, 2008),
http://www.nerc.com/files/Glossary_12Feb08.pdf.
45. Id, see also W. Elec. Coordinating Council, Western Interconnection Balancing
Authorities (2009), available at http://www.wecc.biz/library/WECC%20Documents/
Publications/Balancing%20Authorities.pdf (providing a map illustrating the variability
in size of different balancing authorities).
46. David J. Hurlbut, Multistate Decision Making for Renewable Energy and
Transmission: An Overview, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 677, 685-86 (2010) (explaining that a
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companies, may need to take steps in the management of their
resources to maintain the reliability requirements across the
BA.47 Generators, as will be discussed later, may be required to
purchase other services to maintain reliability.48 Ultimately,
though, the BA is responsible for managing all of the energy
flow within its area to meet NERC reliability requirements.49
It is important to keep in mind that reliability requirements
are not the only factor dictating the cost of integrating
renewables. NERC reliability requirements are placed upon an
entire BA, not upon any single generator.50 How the BA and its
constituent entities meet these requirements has a significant
impact on the overall cost of integration. FERC regulations
outline a general tariff structure allowing transmission
providers to recover reliability costs from generators, which
can also have a significant impact on integration costs.51
The danger comes when reliability is achieved through
adjustments to the system as a whole but the accounting for
those costs is allocated individually to each generating unit.
Allocating a standard transmission tariff for variable energy
resources creates a direct linear relationship between the
amount of VERs on the system and the tariffs charged to those
resources. However, the cost of balancing VERs does not
increase in a linear scale.52 As additional VERs are brought
onto the system, the relative impact of each additional unit
decreases because the variability between VERs will naturally

BA is made up of the “generation, transmission, and loads within its metered
boundaries).
47. See W. Elec. Coordinating Council, supra note 45 (listing numerous electric
utilities which act as BAs including Puget Sound Energy, Bonneville Power
Administration, Los Angeles Department of Water and Power).
48. See infra at Part IV.B (discussing ancillary services which generators may be
required to pay).
49. Hurlbut, supra note 46.
50. See generally NERC, Reliability Standards for the Bulk Electric System of N.
Am., Standard BAL-001-0.1a et seq. (2008) available at http://www.nerc.com/
files/Reliability_Standards_Complete_Set.pdf (applying Real Power Balancing Control
Performance Standard to balancing authorities).
51. See infra at Part IV.B (discussing FERC open access transmission tariffs).
52. See Brendan Kirby, Michael Milligan & Yih-huei Wan, Nat’l Renewable Energy
Lab., Cost-Causation-Based Tariffs for Wind Ancillary Service Impacts 2 (June 2006),
available at http://www.ornl.gov/sci/engineering_science_technology/cooling_heating_
power/pdf/WindPower_2006_Tariff.pdf (finding that linear scaling of wind data can
significantly over estimate wind impacts).
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cancel out.53 What this means is that more wind on a system
make it more likely that low winds at one wind farm will be
cancelled out by gusts at another wind farm. With only two
wind farms the likelihood of this kind of balance is low, but
with 20 wind farms balancing among the wind resources
becomes more likely.
For BAs and other entities responsible for meeting
reliability requirements, the added variability from renewables
impacts both how the grid is managed and how to account for
the cost of that management.
B.

The Electricity System Has Not Been Designed to
Incorporate Renewables

Our current electricity system operators are accustomed to
managing power systems composed of more predictable
resources to meet variable customer demand but with little
experience handling variable electricity generation. To fully
comprehend the context of the changes beginning to happen in
the electricity system it is helpful to understand the current
state of the electricity system. The vast majority of electricity
in the United States comes from nuclear, hydroelectric and
fossil fuel resources.54 These conventional electricity sources
have very predictable operating performance and well
understood characteristics. Perhaps most importantly, utilities
have incorporated each of these technologies into their shortterm and long-term planning processes.55
The electric utilities were created in an age of mostly selfsufficient, vertically integrated electric utilities, which owned
generation, transmission, and distribution facilities.56 Service

53. See id. at 9 (“Aggregating wind plant variability with aggregate system load
further reduces the amount of regulating reserves that are required to balance the
power system and maintain reliability”).
54. See U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., DEP’T OF ENERGY, ELECTRIC POWER ANNUAL
2009, DOE/EIA-0348 Figure ES 1 at 2 (Revised January 4, 2011), available at
http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epa/epa.pdf.
55. See NERC, supra note 38, at 3 (noting that under the NERC reliability
standards utilities must engage in both long-term and short-term energy planning to
meet the electricity demands of customers on their systems).
56. See Recovery of Stranded Costs by Pub. Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61
Fed. Reg. 21,540 at 21,543 (codified at 18 CFR §§ 35 and 385) [hereinafter Order No.
888], available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?
Doc=8274712:0.
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from these facilities was bundled and sold to wholesale and
retail customers.57 Electric utilities built their own generation
facilities and transmission systems. Many relied heavily on
large coal, hydroelectric, or nuclear generating stations.58 Each
system covered limited service areas and was designed to serve
its own load independent of supply and demand from other
service areas.59 This structure of separate systems arose
naturally due primarily to the cost and technological
limitations on the distance over which electricity could be
transmitted.60
For electricity systems built upon this traditional model, the
majority of the system variability comes from the demand for
energy. While utilities can forecast electricity demand, these
forecasts are not exact. When a customer decides to turn on
the light in her house, no one needs to call the local utility to
tell them they are going to need a little more power. However,
system operators know with a high degree of certainty that a
nuclear plant will be running 24 hours a day.61 This steady and
consistent power supply is known as baseload power.62
Likewise, if a natural gas plant is scheduled to come on to
serve peak electricity demand system operators can expect
that power plant to deliver the needed power.63 These peaking
power plants are cycled on and off to follow the changing
demands of the energy system throughout the day and the
seasons. Because of their ability to quickly cycle on and off,
these peaking plants also serve a critical backup role if another
energy resource is not available. These two types of plants,
baseload and peaking, have represented the two primary
categories for our electricity supply.64
Introducing significant amounts of variable resources to the
system places uncertainty on both the supply and demand
sides of the energy equation. For BAs and other entities which
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See James F. Wilson, Restructuring the Electric Power Industry: Past Problems,
Future Directions, 16 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T 232, 235 (2002) (distinguishing
baseload and peaking power).
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Ferrey, supra note 7, at 987.
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must continuously match the supply and demand, this added
variability and unpredictability makes the job more difficult.65
First, there must be enough energy available in the case that
wind and solar resources are not available at any given
moment. Second, sufficient energy must also be available to
meet future demands and ultimately ensure compliance with
NERC’s reliability standards.66
C.

Where Renewables Fit Into the Energy Supply

Given the variability of energy supply from renewables,
where do resources like solar and wind fit into the historical
categories of baseload and peaking power? Renewable VERs
are unable to be classified as baseload because they
demonstrate relatively low availability factors.67 However, due
to the same unpredictable availability, variable renewable
resources also cannot be relied upon to fill in as peaking power
resources. As a result VERs are currently taken whenever they
are available, similar to a baseload power plant, while
decreasing the reliability of the overall baseload energy supply.
Operating VERs whenever they are available makes
economic sense because the resources have extremely low
marginal cost for production. In this sense, VERs share some
characteristics with other baseload resources which have low
marginal cost for energy production. 68 Wind and solar plants
can have significant capital costs; however, once a wind plant
enters operation there are no fuel costs and relatively low
operations costs.69 Thus the more energy the plant generates,
the lower the overall cost of the energy it produces. This has
significant implications for system operators who prioritize
dispatch of energy according to marginal cost with the
cheapest resources coming first.70 The result is renewable
65. See NERC Report, supra note 38, at 3.
66. See id.
67. See Steven Ferrey, The Law of Independent Power § 2:11 (25th ed. 2009); see also
RENEWABLE ENERGY RESEARCH LAB, UNIV. OF MASS. AT AMHERST, WIND POWER:
CAPACITY FACTOR, INTERMITTENCY, AND WHAT HAPPENS WHEN THE WIND DOESN’T
BLOW? (2004), available at http://www.ceere.org/rerl/about_wind/RERL_Fact_
Sheet_2a_Capacity_Factor.pdf (stating that typical wind power capacity is 20-40%,
hydro power capacity is 30-80%, and solar power capacity is 12-15%).
68. See Ferrey, supra note 7, at 987.
69. See id. at 987.
70. See id. at 987-988.
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energy units that will always be utilized when available,
taking precedence over all other resources including large
baseload plants.71
This represents a radical shift in management of baseload
resources. To achieve the lowest marginal cost, most
traditional coal and nuclear power plants are designed to run
constantly at peak efficiency.72 If taken offline to accommodate
renewables, these conventional power plants require
significant time to restart and cannot be quickly brought back
into operation.73 Put more simply, these plants are designed to
serve the around-the-clock demands of the energy system. If
forced to cycle on and off, these plants no longer serve their
designed purpose and will run less efficiently.74 This decreased
efficiency translates to increases in the cost of the electricity
produced as well as the pollution created per unit of energy.
Increasing renewable energy has three major implications
for the cost of electricity. First, running old base load plants
below peak efficiency means that utilities and ultimately
ratepayers will pay more for the energy they purchase from
these plants.75 Second, because these base load plants may be
forced to occasionally shut down due to renewable availability,
the traditional base load generators will be selling less power
overall. Finally, the decreases in system resource availability
and reliability will increase the demand for backup power
resources to compensate for the base load fluctuations caused
by variable renewable resources.76 These costs make up what
have generally been characterized as renewable integration
costs.77 Complaints from BAs currently managing these costs

71. See id. at 988.
72. See Ferrey, supra note 61, at §10.37 (noting the difficulty in quickly starting
conventional power plants); see also Steven Lefton & Phil Presuner, The Cost of
Cycling Coal Fired Power Plants, COAL POWER MAG., Winter 2006, at 16, 20, available
at http://www.aptecheng.com/corporate/CurrentEvents/100_CoalPowerWinterMag1620.pdf.
73. See Ferrey, supra note 67, at 988.
74. Id.
75. See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, DEP’T OF ENERGY, WESTERN WIND AND
SOLAR INTEGRATION STUDY 315-316 (2010) [hereinafter NREL INTEGRATION STUDY],
available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2010/wwsis_
final_report.pdf.
76. See Ferrey, supra note 7, at 990.
77. See, e.g., Mark Bolinger & Ryan Wiser, Balancing Cost and Risk: The Treatment
of Renewable Energy in Western Utility Resource Plans 1 (2005), available at
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have generated significant debate about the future of
renewable energy on the electricity grid.78
D.

The Cost of Renewable Success

Experts predict wind and solar will make up anywhere from
eleven percent to thirty-five percent of the energy supply for
the Western United States by 2025, representing a substantial
increase from current levels.79 The result of successes in the
expansion of VERs will be a corresponding increase in the need
for new quick-starting peaking power plants that can provide
the backup power for the renewables.80 More VERs will mean
increased integration costs. Just how significant these costs
will be is a subject of vigorous debate. Both NERC and the
National Renewable Energy Lab (NREL) have commissioned
studies to investigate the issue.81
The NREL study found that under most scenarios a high
penetration of wind and solar would actually decrease the
system operating costs across the Western U.S.82 However, one
scenario requiring more significant curtailment of coal plant
operation did show a significant increase in annual operating
costs.83 Moreover, assumptions in the NREL study could be
viewed as artificially inflating the cost of fossil fuel energy.
Most notably the study assumes a cost of $30 per metric ton of
CO2 presumably resulting from passage of federal climate
change legislation.84 This is a dubious assumption, considering
passage of comprehensive climate regulation appears remote
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/37p4j85p; see also Avista Corp., Wind Integration Study
at x (2007), available at http://www.uwig.org/AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf
(defining integration cost as “. . . the reduction in value of wind energy due to its
variability and uncertainty.”).
78. See, e.g., Order Rejecting Proposed Tariff Revisions, 132 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,128
(August 13, 2010) [hereinafter Puget Rejection].
79. See NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75, at 116-117 and ES-2.
80. See Ferrey, supra note 57, at 994.
81. See, e.g., NERC, supra note 38, at 3; NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75;
and NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB, DEP’T OF ENERGY, EASTERN WIND INTEGRATION
STUDY (2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2010/
ewits_final_report.pdf.
82. See NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75, at ES-14–ES-28 (finding that the
highest savings reported in the 30% renewable penetration case resulted in a 40%
system operations savings across the WECC service territory).
83. Id. at ES-28.
84. See id. at ES-3.
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outside of California, the Northeast, and some cities which
have already adopted such measures.85 Ultimately NREL
acknowledges that its study does not take into account the
costs “. . .that would be required to implement the operational
reforms needed to accommodate the renewables[.]”86 While the
reduced cost projections are a good motivator for achieving a
higher level of renewables on our grid, ultimately the report
does not take on the difficult task of estimating the cost of
implementing its recommended changes.
The NERC study goes even further to avoid predicting the
ultimate cost for achieving a fully integrated grid.87 However,
NERC shares NREL’s conclusion that a functional integrated
grid is achievable, finding that “[t]his proposed level of
commitment to renewable variable generation offers many
benefits such as new energy resources, fuel diversification, and
greenhouse gas and particulates reductions.”88
Determining these costs is a key first step in the process of
renewables integration. Once the costs are determined,
perhaps an even more divisive step must be taken when
payment of the integration costs is allocated throughout the
energy system. Within the energy system costs are felt by
generators, utility companies and ratepayers. While law and
policy can have some role in determining what the costs are,
they play a much larger role in the allocation of those costs.
IV. LEGAL LANDSCAPE
Given the complex legal and regulatory landscape for
electricity, it is helpful to have some understanding of the laws
underpinning the regulation of electricity in the US and how
these laws interact with the integration of renewable energy.

85. See id. at ES-3; see also Editorial, At Least Some Politicians Get It, N. Y. TIMES,
January 10, 2011, at A20, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/10/opinion/
10mon3.html?ref=climateandenergylegislation (discussing the inability of Congress to
pass climate legislation and the patchwork of climate programs that have been passed
in some cities and states across the country).
86. NREL INTEGRATION STUDY, supra note 75, at ES-14.
87. See NERC, supra note 38, at 3 (“. . . NERC does not advocate a particular
resource mix, weight cost allocation approaches or recommend specific technology
solutions to address identified reliability concerns.”).
88. Id. at 63.
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A.

Federal Power Act and Amendments

Originally passed in 1920 to regulate and coordinate the
development of hydroelectric projects across the United States,
the Federal Power Act (FPA) has expanded in scope to regulate
transmission and wholesale purchases of electricity in
interstate commerce.89 The FPA created the Federal Power
Commission (later reorganized as FERC) to enforce the FPA.90
Of particular significance for renewable VER integration is
section 205(a) requiring “[a]ll rates and charges made,
demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection
with the transmission or sale of electric energy. . .shall be just
and reasonable.”91 This provision has laid the foundation for
many key regulations and cases which provide the current
structure for the pricing of electricity including renewables.92
This passage was made all the more significant by the passage
of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (1992 Act) which mandated
non-discriminatory open access to transmission.93 This change
represented a fundamental shift in the structure of the
electricity
market
from
utility-dominated
generation
monopolies to more competitive markets for independent
electricity generators.94
B.

New Laws and Regulations Begin to Open the Market

Passage of the 1992 Act empowered FERC to have a greater
involvement in utility ratemaking.95 One potential method for
discriminating against market participants was through
pricing for transmission, which is often owned by utility
companies. FERC’s new authority allowed the Commission to
regulate transmission rates to ensure all market participants
89. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. (2011); see also 29 C.J.S. Electricity §
3 (2011).
90. 16 U.S.C. § 792 (2011); see also 29 C.J.S. Electricity § 6.
91. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2011).
92. See generally Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham, The
Requirements of the “Just and Reasonable” Standard: Legal Bases for Reform of
Electric Transmission Rates, 21 ENERGY L.J. 389 (2000).
93. 16 U.S.C. § 824k(a) (2011).
94. Susan Kelly & Elise Caplan, Time For a Day 1.5 Market: A Proposal to Reform
RTO-Run Centralized Wholesale Electricity Markets, 29 ENERGY L.J. 491, 492 (2008).
95. 16 U.S.C. § 824k (2011) (giving FERC authority to regulate electric transmission
rates).
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had equal market access. As part of this move to a more open
market, FERC indicated its willingness to allow utilities to
recover “opportunity costs” in addition to their standard rate
even before the 1992 Act was passed.96 FERC explained that
opportunity costs, “are incurred by a utility when the utility
accommodates a third party’s request for transmission service.
. .and thereby foregoes an opportunity to reduce its own costs,
to the economic detriment of the utility’s native load
customers.”97 In other words, generators who increased costs
for their transmission provider could be required to pay for
those costs. These opportunity costs opened the door for what
has become the current debate regarding integration costs.
FERC cases addressing opportunity costs necessarily
implicate the just and reasonable rate standard of the FPA.
Courts have generally upheld FERC’s rulings deferring to the
Commission’s judgment. One of the first cases to address the
just and reasonable standard in relation to opportunity costs
was Pennsylvania Electric Co. v. FERC.98 In that case the D.C.
Circuit was willing to defer to FERC’s technical ratemaking
expertise so long as it supplies “sufficient reasoning backed up
by substantial evidence.”99 The court further noted the
obligation for just and reasonable rates runs on both sides of
the meter to both electricity customers and independent power
producers such as renewable generators.100 Even though the
price of an energy contract was the product of bilateral
negotiations between the utility and the generator, FERC
determined that the opportunity cost was not just and
reasonable for ratepayers who had not participated in the
negotiation.101

96. Pa. Elec. Co. v. F.E.R.C., 11 F.3d 207, 209 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (upholding FERC’s
approval of additional service charges for the provision of electric transmission
service).
97. Pa. Elec. Co., 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,871 (1992); see also Re Public Service Co. of New
Hampshire, 58 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,070 (1992); and Northeast Utilities Service Co., 58
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,069 (1992).
98. Pa. Elec. Co., supra at note 96.
99. Id. at 211.
100. Id. at 209-10 (explaining that, “ FERC’s responsibility…is to ensure just and
reasonable rates for native load customers and for third parties” such as generators or
other utility companies); See also Ferrey, supra note 67, § 8:9.
101. See Pa. Elec. Co., supra note 96, at 209-10 (explaining, “ FERC’s
responsibility…is to ensure just and reasonable rates for native load customers and for
third parties. Whether a rate satisfies this requirement is to be determined by FERC,
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FERC formalized its rulings on opportunity costs with
promulgation of Order No. 888 requiring public utilities
transmitting electricity to have non-discriminatory open access
transmission tariffs (OATT).102 However, the order also
permits public utilities to seek recovery of legitimate and
verifiable “stranded costs” associated with providing open
access.103 These stranded costs closely resemble the description
of “opportunity costs” FERC had discussed in its decisions just
a few years earlier.104 Ultimately Order No. 888 and the ability
for utilities to recover the costs of complying with new laws
and regulations represents the first step in a series of legal and
regulatory changes which lowered barriers and made more
room for competition in the electricity industry.
One of the significant products of stranded costs was the
creation of several categories of “ancillary services”
transmission providers charge to their customers to implement
the open access reforms.105 Three categories of ancillary
services are of particular importance to renewable generators:
imbalance service, spinning reserve service, and operating
reserve service. Imbalance service “makes up for any net
mismatch over an hour between the scheduled delivery of
energy and the actual load that the energy serves in the
control area.”106 Imbalance service allows utilities to charge
renewables generators for not meeting their scheduled
obligations for delivered energy and has long been argued as
discriminatory against intermittent renewable energy
resources.107
Spinning reserve and supplemental reserve services
(characterized generally as operating reserve) provide, “extra
not the parties to an agreement, however voluntary their agreement may be.”).
102. Order No. 888, supra note 56, at 21540.
103. Id. at 21541.
104. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.26 (2011) (generally stranded costs may be recovered through
retail rates by utilities for any costs incurred providing required services to
customers).
105. Order No. 888, supra note 56, at 21579–21590.
106. Id. at 21582.
107. See, e.g., Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission
Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 12266, Summary (Mar. 15, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt.
35, 37) [hereinafter Order No. 890], available at http://www.ferc.gov/whats-new/commmeet/2007/021507/E-1.pdf; see also National Wind Coordinating Collaborative, FERC
Order 890: What Does it Mean for the West?, available at http://www.nationalwind.org/
assets/publications/ferc890.pdf.

https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjelp/vol1/iss1/5

20

Vercruyssen: Renewable Energy Integration Costs: Who Pays and How Much?

2011]

RENEWABLE ENERGY INTEGRATION COSTS

201

generation available to serve load in case there is an
unplanned event such as loss of generation.”108 Each
transmission region has specific required reserve amounts
based upon system characteristics in that region.109 This
service can then be imposed upon specific generators such as
VERs which require higher levels of operating reserve.110
Order No. 888 had the positive effect of opening an
electricity market that had been closely controlled by the
transmission owners, most often electric utilities. Independent
renewable energy generators have been a primary beneficiary
of this market opening. In opening the door, though,
renewables generators saw still more obstacles on the other
side in the form of stranded costs and ancillary services they
would be required to buy.
C.

Policies Designed Specifically for Renewable Energy

As a result of federal and state policies supporting
renewable energy, development of those resources continued to
increase.111 FERC reacted by initiating a proceeding which
would result in the approval of Order No. 890 to limit
discrimination against transmission customers and “increase
transparency in the rules applicable to planning and use of the
transmission system.”112 The order’s intent was partly to
benefit renewable resources through more equitable
transmission access and pricing.113
One of the most significant changes the order made for the
growth of renewable energy was the creation of a “conditional
firm” and “hourly firm” transmission service.114 Conditional
firm service allows a transmission provider to guarantee a
generator access to transmission with the condition that the
transmission provider can curtail that generator under certain

108. Order No. 888, supra note 56, at 21582–21583.
109. Id.
110. See North American Electric Reliability Corporation, WECC Standard
Operating Reserves, BAL-STD-002-0 (2007), available at http://www.nerc.com/files/
BAL-STD-002-0.pdf.
111. See supra at 6.
112. Order No. 890, supra note 107, at Summary.
113. Id. ¶ 78 (noting that measures undertaken in the order “can be particularly
beneficial to renewable generation resources”).
114. Id. ¶ 73, 925, 1177.
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grid conditions or for a certain defined number of hours during
the year.115 Hourly firm service allows transmission customers
to request firm transmission service on shorter notice the day
before the service is to commence.116
Conditional firm service addressed a problem that prior
rules created for wind generators; previously, FERC tariffs
allowed transmission operators to reject transmission
contracts with generators if the transmission would not be
available for even a single hour of the contract period.117
Without long-term transmission rights, renewable generators
could not procure financing for construction. Prior to
conditional firm contracts, transmission operators had only
been able to enter into two kinds of contracts: firm service and
non-firm service. Firm service provides almost unconditional
access to transmission usually under a long-term contract.118
Non-firm service is reserved and scheduled as-available, can be
interrupted under specific conditions, and cannot be contracted
for longer than one year.119
Variable renewable resources did not easily fit into either of
these categories. Purchasing firm service would inherently
underutilize the transmission capacity. Specific terms for
delivered energy could never be met for resources which
cannot be scheduled with precision.120 At the same time, under
a firm contract, the transmission operator would be required to
hold open transmission capacity for renewables in the case the
energy was available as scheduled. As a result, a renewable
generator entering a firm contract would be paying for more
transmission access than would ever be used by the renewable
project. The transmission operator, on the other hand, would
underutilize transmission assets which could not be scheduled
under the terms of the contract even if there was no power
coming from the renewable project. Renewable generators also
could not rely solely on non-firm service because year-to-year
contracts create too much uncertainty for potential investors.
115. Id. ¶ 925.
116. Id. ¶ 1178.
117. Id. ¶ 86. The transmission service provider would thus be required to reserve
transmission capacity for a renewable project that, because of its intermittent nature,
would never fully utilize the purchased transmission capacity.
118. Nunez, supra note 1, at 169.
119. Id.
120. See Ferrey, supra note 67, § 2:11.
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Conditional firm service solves these problems by allowing
transmission operators to offer long-term contracts while
retaining the right to interrupt transmission access under
certain limited conditions. Essentially, these terms give
transmission operators the ability to limit transmission access
to the generator until congestion can be relieved and firm
transmission can be offered.
In addition, Order No. 890 opened the door for hourly-firm
service which offers a more attractive alternative to the old
non-firm service.121 While FERC did not require transmission
owners to offer hourly-firm service, the Commission made it
clear that such a service was permissible.122 Hourly-firm
service guarantees transmission access in hourly increments
and can be scheduled as late as 10:00 a.m. the day before the
service is to commence.123 This creates a more reliable spot
market for renewable generators to sell into when compared
against/with as-available non-firm service. Because the
availability of variable renewable resources is difficult to
determine far in advance, hourly firm service gives renewable
generators incentive to improve forecasting in order to
accurately predict energy output for sale into the hourly firm
market.
Taken together, conditional firm and hourly firm
transmission services represent a significant improvement on
the electricity market structure for variable renewable
resources. Conditional firm service gives renewable generators
long-term transmission contracts required to finance projects.
Hourly firm service encourages renewable generators to
improve forecasting and allows them to sell into a reliable spot
market when their resource availability does not match their
scheduled transmission access under a conditional-firm
contract. While conditional-firm service provides a foundation
to finance new projects, hourly firm service allows renewable
generators to maximize the sale of all electricity as it becomes
available.
Order No. 890 also tried to rectify the harm caused by the
121. Order No. 890, supra note 107, ¶ 1212-1213.
122. See Id. at 1213 (explaining that “transmission operators will continue to have
the option to propose offering hourly firm service in an FPA section 205 filing with the
Commission”).
123. See, e.g., Id at 1178 (explaining FERCs proposal for required hourly firm
service).

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2011

23

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 5

204 WASHINGTON J. OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY [Vol. 1:1

“discriminatory pricing” of imbalance service.124 Previous
regulations under Order No. 888 had given wide discretion to
transmission entities in determining the rates charged for
imbalance penalties and was thus subject to abuse.125 To
address the situation, FERC adopted a tiered structure for
imbalance services and exempted intermittent resources,
including renewables, from the highest tier. In addition, FERC
tied the cost of the imbalance service to the incremental cost of
energy for a given transmission system.126
While these specific regulatory actions to encourage
renewable energy have helped increase growth in the sector,
both renewable generators and transmission providers have
continued to battle over the costs renewables place on the
system and how to allocate those costs.
V.

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE DEBATE OVER
RENEWABLE INTEGRATION

In the past year the intensity has increased in the debate
over renewable energy integration. Recent events have focused
the attention of utilities, system operators, and generators of
renewable and traditional energy technologies. In August,
FERC rejected a proposal by Puget Sound Energy (Puget) to
modify its OATT to create a wind integration service.127 This
proposal followed several similar efforts by other utilities
across the U.S. Shortly afterward, FERC issued notice of a
proposed rulemaking to reform the OATT by modifying
ancillary service rules as well as offering intra-hour
transmission scheduling. This section offers an overview of the
utility proposals and suggests the implications these proposals
may have on FERC’s Proposed Rule.
A.

Puget Sound Energy Tariff Proposal
In August 2010, a proposal from Puget to modify its OATT

124. Id. ¶ 70.
125. Id.
126. Id.; see also S. Cal. Water Co. v. F.E.R.C., 433 F.3d 840, 842 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(ruling on a contract dispute in which the contract defined incremental cost as,
“expense incurred…in providing an additional increment of energy or capacity”).
127. Puget Rejection, supra note 78.
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to include a “Wind Following Service” was rejected by FERC.128
The proposal would have allowed Puget to recover the costs
associated with following and balancing the within-hour
variations in output from wind generation.129 All wind
resources within Puget’s balancing authority would be
required to purchase the Wind Following Service or enter into
a contractual arrangement with a third party to provide the
service, or self-supply the service.130
Puget argued that under its current transmission tariff
structure it cannot afford to add additional wind resources
while maintaining compliance with NERC reliability
standards.131 Puget currently has sufficient hydroelectric and
natural gas resources to balance the existing wind on its
system. In the future, Puget argues, additional wind resources
will require the utility to seek out new following and balancing
resources to support the new wind. Puget characterizes the
cost of procuring these new resources as an opportunity cost
under FERC regulations, with Puget customers effectively
subsidizing wind following and balancing services.132 Under
the following service Puget proposes, wind generators within
Puget’s balancing area would shoulder the cost of balancing
the intermittency of wind energy.133
A crucial element of the proposal and its ultimate failure
was the cost calculation of the service charge. Puget based the
cost of the charge upon the capital cost of flexible electric
capacity from a General Electric natural gas peaker generating
unit.134 Opponents argued that although Puget would
experience opportunity costs with holding additional reserve
generation, it would not incur the need for additional
generating to serve loads; in the worst case scenario when

128. Id. ¶ 1.
129. Id. ¶ 4.
130. Id. ¶ 4. (If the service is to be provided by a third party, the terms of the
contract must be acceptable to PSE).
131. Id. ¶ 3.
132. Id. at ¶ 8 (explaining that “…dedicating stored hydroelectric capacity for use by
wind generation would present a steep opportunity cost to Puget’s native load
customers, and shifting this stored hydroelectric capacity to a wind balancing function
would inappropriately subsidize the cost of providing following capacity to wind
generation.”).
133. Id.
134. Id. ¶ 9.
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wind stops blowing Puget would operate just as much
generation as it would require absent wind on its system and
therefore the cost of new generating units was not
representative of their costs.135 Part of Puget’s rationale for
using the cost of new generation as a proxy for the service
charge was an insufficient market for following services to
support new wind generation.136 Without a strong market,
Puget was forced to rely on hypothetical pricing mechanisms
instead.
FERC rejected Puget’s proposal as not meeting the standard
of “just and reasonable” under the FPA.137 Because the rate
Puget proposed was hypothetical and not based on any
demonstrable costs, the charge for the service could potentially
exceed the actual cost of providing it.138 The terms of rejection
do not completely rule out approval of a similar following
service if the rate was more closely based on the cost of
providing the service. In rejecting Puget’s initial proposal,
FERC did so without prejudice, welcoming a new rate
proposal.139
B.

Other Utility Tariff Proposals

FERC does not expressly state what modifications would be
required to meet the just and reasonable standard, but other
similar proposals and the reaction from FERC afford some
indication.140 In its Puget ruling, FERC suggests that any
charges should be related to “actual, demonstrable costs
incurred in providing service.”141 Furthermore, in calculating
the service charge, Puget must show that the charges will not

135. Id.
136. Amendment to Open Access Transmission Tariff, Schedule 12, Wind
Integration Within-Hour Generation Following Service, Puget Sound Energy, Inc.,
Docket No. ER10-1436-000, at 2 (June 14, 2010) (explaining “Unfortunately, a liquid
market for…flexible capacity does not exist in the Pacific Northwest”) (on file with
author).
137. Puget Rejection, supra note 78, ¶ 31; see also 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2011).
138. Id. ¶ 34.
139. Id. ¶ 35.
140. See, e.g., NorthWestern Corp., 129 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,116 (2009) [hereinafter
NorthWestern], order on reh’g, 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,202 (2010); Westar Energy Inc., 130
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215 (2010); Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 131 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,087
(2010).
141. Puget Rejection, supra note 78, ¶¶ 31, 34.
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lead to recoveries beyond the actual costs Puget incurs in
providing the service.142
Based upon these requirements it would seem that the only
way for Puget to evince the cost of their following service is to
enter into a contract with a generator to actually provide the
needed service. This suggests that FERC requires more
thorough analysis than Puget provided. One way of doing that
would be to undertake the sort of in-depth “wind integration
cost study” some utilities have embarked on, or conversely to
base charges on actual incurred costs where ancillary service
markets exist and those services can be explicitly procured. In
rejecting Puget’s request, FERC also acknowledges the
difficulty of the situation saying, “[c]hanging system
conditions, such as an increasing amount of wind generation
described by Puget, present unique challenges that may
require novel solutions.”143 Other systems are experiencing
similar strains.
In a filing from NorthWestern Corp. (NorthWestern), the
transmission provider proposed that wind resources exporting
energy to another balancing authority be required to provide
their own balancing service.144 NorthWestern reasoned that
the proposal was necessary to ensure customers within its BA
would not be paying for balancing service without receiving the
energy produced from the wind generators.145 FERC ruled that
this proposal conflicted with NorthWestern’s existing
obligation to offer balancing and following services.146 This
ruling makes it clear that BAs such as utility companies and
transmission providers must offer all VERs some kind of
balancing and following services. The question then becomes
one of pricing these services; the issue that Puget had
struggled with.
One utility has had at least partial success in implementing
an energy imbalance service charge. Westar Energy Inc.
(Westar) proposed charging generator regulation services to all
resources exporting energy out of Westar’s balancing authority

142. Id. ¶ 34.
143. Id. ¶ 31.
144. NorthWestern, supra note 140.
145. Id. ¶ 3.
146. Id. ¶ 14.
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area.147 Rather than proposing a standardized service charge
as Puget had, Westar proposed apportioning the total charge
between dispatchable resources and VERs based upon their
respective burdens upon the system.148 FERC accepted this
proposal on an interim basis until a market for such services
could be developed.149 While FERC’s acceptance of this
proposal indicates a willingness to allow energy imbalance
charges generally, continued focus on market driven pricing
points to the ultimate goal. A rulemaking currently underway
at FERC may present a better defined path toward
implementing comprehensive renewable energy integration
measures.
C.

FERC Proposed Rulemaking on Renewable Integration
Measures

Acknowledging the pressure many utilities and transmission
operators feel from increasing VERs, FERC has initiated a
rulemaking reopening many of the issues addressed by Order
No. 890.150 Two elements of the Proposed Rule would directly
address renewable integration cost concerns. First, FERC
proposes to require public utility transmission providers to
offer intra-hourly transmission scheduling.151 Second, FERC
proposes to amend the pro forma OATT to include a
“Generator Regulation and Frequency Response Service”
(Response Service).152
The requirement of intra-hourly scheduling is intended to
better reflect the scheduling constraints of renewable energy,
resulting in more efficient use of transmission and generation
resources.153 Giving transmission providers authority to adjust
schedules within the operating hour allows transmission
providers to commit fewer resources as reserves to back up the
variability of renewables.154
The creation of a pro forma OATT for Response Service will
147. Westar Energy Inc., 130 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,215, ¶ 1 (2010).
148. Id. at 35-36.
149. Id. at 35.
150. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8.
151. Id. ¶ 3.
152. Id.
153. Id. ¶ 4.
154. Id. ¶ 5.
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allow transmission providers to price integration cost charges
such as the one proposed by Puget. The proposal would provide
a generic rate schedule prescribing how transmission providers
could recover costs from balancing variability from
generators.155 At the same time, FERC argues that providing
the generic pro forma tariff schedule increases market
transparency and competition by informing all market
participants of the cost of such a service.156 These two
measures will provide some relief to the stresses renewable
energy has placed on the system, but in places FERC has not
gone far enough.
VI. TAKING THE NEXT STEP IN RENEWABLE ENERGY
INTEGRATION
The notice of inquiry for FERC’s proposed rulemaking
stimulated extensive reaction from utility companies,
renewable generators, and government agencies.157 The
Proposed Rule addresses some concerns relating to integration
costs and scheduling constraints. Yet the proposal from FERC
backs away from significant opportunities to create more liquid
markets for VERs and ancillary services. The following section
will discuss how close FERC comes to achieving the stated goal
of removing practices that unduly discriminate against
variable energy resources.158
A.

Requiring Shorter Uniform Scheduling Blocks

FERC’s proposal requiring transmission providers to
schedule generation in smaller time increments would
undoubtedly improve market conditions for renewable energy
generators. Bonneville Power Administration, a utility and
balancing authority with large amounts of wind energy, has
estimated that scheduling in ten-minute increments could
reduce system integration costs by eighty percent.159 Others
155. Id. ¶ 5.
156. Id. ¶ 5.
157. See FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, et seq. (discussing various comments
received from over 130 different commenters following the notice of inquiry).
158. Id. at Summary.
159. Bart McManus, Bonneville Power Administration Wind Integration Technical
Lead, Large Wind Integration Challenges and Solutions for Operations/System
Reliability, at slide 26 (Oct. 2008), available at http://www.uwig.org/Denver/
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have estimated integration cost reductions of forty to sixty
percent depending on different balancing authority
characteristics such as the amount of VERs, system load, and
other measures taken to integrate the VERs into the system.160
These cost reductions come from a number of different
places. First, the shorter intervals allow more precise
scheduling that reflects the rapid changes in output from wind
generators, ultimately allowing more accurate system
forecasts.161 More accurate scheduling means fewer reserves
must be scheduled to balance any variability from renewable
resources.
Second, changing the scheduling intervals provides system
flexibility at a very low cost. NERC reliability requirements
force transmission providers to procure expensive balancing
reserves in hourly increments to match the scheduling of the
variable energy.162 Flexibility can be created at a lower cost by
allowing shorter scheduling blocks. These shorter scheduling
blocks allow transmission providers to maximize reliability
simply through more dynamic resource scheduling and without
procurement of additional resources.163 A system operator can
schedule a VER when it is available even if that is only a short
period of time. These shorter scheduling chunks also mean
that system operators can purchase the following services in
smaller increments. Allowing scheduling which more closely
follows the characteristics of the generation ultimately allows
for more efficient operation of the system as a whole.
Third, NERC expects that intra-hour scheduling will allow
McManus.pdf (“10 minute schedule changes would solve ~80% of the [integration]
issues BPA is anticipating.”)
160. Avista Corporation, Wind Integration Study, Table 24: Effect on Integration
Cost of Short-Term Liquid Markets 48 (2007), available at http://www.uwig.org/
AvistaWindIntegrationStudy.pdf.
161. Response of the Western Electricity Coordinating Council to the Notice of
Inquiry Addressing Integration of Variable Energy Resources, FERC Docket No.
RM10-11-000, at 6-7 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter WECC Response], available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=12309166:0.
162. Comments of the American Wind Energy Association, FERC Docket No. RM1011-000, at 38 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter AWEA Comments], available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=1
2315786:0.
163. MICHAEL MILLIGAN & BRENDAN KIRBY, IMPACT OF BALANCING AREA SIZE,
OBLIGATION SHARING, AND RAMPING CAPABILITY ON WIND INTEGRATION 27-29,
available at http://www.nrel.gov/wind/systemsintegration/pdfs/2007/
milligan_wind_integration_impacts.pdf.
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systems to respond to events in real time. These smaller
scheduling blocks provide more accurate market data for
providers of ancillary services, such as balancing reserves.164
More accurate market data will lead to more efficient and
economic scheduling and greater competition among service
providers.
Taken together, the most significant overall effect of intrahour scheduling should be a reduced need for VER balancing
from other resources. NERC anticipates revisiting its
reliability requirements because of the expected decrease in
demand for balancing resources.165 Such a measure by NERC
would reduce the amount of following capacity BAs would be
required to carry to meet reliability standards and thus reduce
the overall cost of VER integration.
FERC proposes requiring intra-hour scheduling in fifteenminute increments, creating four scheduling blocks for each
hour.166 The determination of the ideal time increment is
described as a trade-off between improved reliability from
more flexible scheduling and the cost of the updated
infrastructure necessary to implement the requirement.167 By
electing the fifteen-minute time interval, FERC believes it is
choosing the increment which will create the lowest burden on
system infrastructure while still providing the flexibility
needed by VERs.168
FERC chose a maximum scheduling interval of fifteen
minutes in the face of pressure to provide a more flexible
standard. Formal comments from numerous entities
responsible for system operations urged FERC not to adopt a
rigid standard.169 FERC should not cave in to this pressure. By

164. Comments of the North American Electric Reliability Corporation in Response
to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s January 21, 2010 Notice of Inquiry on
the Integration of Variable Energy Resources, FERC Docket No. RM10-11-000, at 1718
(Apr.
12,
2010)
[hereinafter
NERC
Response],
available
at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=1
2314664:0.
165. NERC Response, supra note 164, at 17-18.
166. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 37.
167. WECC Response, supra note 161, at 7.
168. NERC Response, supra note 164, at 17-18 (concluding that the ideal range of
time increments would be five to fifteen minutes depending on system characteristics).
169. See, e.g., Comments of the Edison Electric Institute, FERC Docket No. RM 1011-000, at 8-9 (Apr. 2010) available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/
advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=12314178:0 (claiming that because “of
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mandating a standard scheduling increment, which all
transmission providers will be required to provide, FERC
creates common market rules. At the same time the fifteenminute interval operates only as a maximum. Transmission
providers will still be allowed to offer scheduling in smaller
increments if they find it appropriate or advantageous.
Standard scheduling will make it easier for renewable
generators to schedule and sell their product to different BAs.
The current proposal encourages compatibility while still
allowing individual BAs to customize their scheduling
practices as necessary.
FERC must still be vigilant though, because this limited
flexibility can allow barriers to persist. If one BA schedules
power in ten-minute increments and a neighboring BA
schedules power in eight-minute increments, generators may
have a difficult time scheduling between the two. FERC should
further encourage BAs to have consistent scheduling practices
across regions. By mandating intra-hour scheduling in
compatible intervals, FERC can significantly reduce the cost of
renewable integration and improve overall system
performance.
B.

Charging Renewable Generators for Ancillary Services

In allocating integration costs FERC analogizes renewable
VERs with variability on the customer side of the electric
meter. The new Response Service proposed by FERC would be
priced using the same cost assessment for balancing customer
load variability.170 According to FERC, regulation of customer
load and regulation of generation are functionally equivalent
because both are designed to recover the costs of holding
regulation reserve capacity to meet system variability.171 This
argument may not fully consider the different benefits of
increased renewable energy compared to regulation of

the variation in market structure and rules throughout the county, it is unlikely that
any single scheduling practice will suit all regions.”); Comments of the Bonneville
Power Administration, FERC Docket No. RM10-11-000, at 6 (Apr. 2010) available at
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/search/advintermediate.asp?link_desc=yes&slcfilelist=1
2314631:0 (urging FERC not to mandate intra-hour scheduling but instead allow
regional cost-benefit analyses).
170. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 92–94.
171. Id. ¶ 93.
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customer load. Costs should fall upon all those who receive
benefits from renewable energy.
Because the resource requirements are functionally the
same for balancing customer load and generator output, FERC
argues that the pricing mechanisms should also be consistent.
This argument does not consider where the costs of Response
Service will land in relation to the benefits of the service.
Under the customer load-balancing tariff, the transmission
customer taking energy off of the grid pays for the balancing
service.172 The cost of the service is then placed on electric
utilities that are the direct transmission customers and that
cost is then passed on to utility customers. In paying for this
service, utility customers gain the ability to cycle their
electricity without service disruptions. The small variations in
electricity caused by turning the lights on or starting the
dishwasher are addressed by this balancing service. The cost of
the service is then spread across the entire utility ratepayer
base - the primary beneficiaries of the service.
Placing a similar charge upon variable renewable energy
generators disconnects the placement of costs from the
benefits. While there are costs associated with integrating
renewable energy, it may not be appropriate for these costs to
be borne solely by renewable generators. In efforts to treat all
generators neutrally, FERC has lost sight of the policy goals
that have stimulated growth in renewable energy.173
Renewable energy policies offer broad public benefits such as
reduced pollution, increased energy security, and mitigation of
global warming.174 As a result, while renewable generators
should undoubtedly shoulder some of the burden, the costs for
bringing renewable energy to the grid should also be shared
more broadly.
The proposed service may be fair in the sense that it uses
the same metrics to calculate the cost of similar services.
However, in allocating those costs, the service could still be
seen to unduly discriminate against renewable energy
172. Order No. 890, supra note 107, at Open Access Transmission Tariff Schedule 3,
Tariff Sheet No. 131 (explaining, “The Transmission Customer must either purchase
this service from the Transmission Provider or make alternative comparable
arrangements…”).
173. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 93 (recounting FERC’s policy to utilize the
same rate structure for customer load and generator imbalance service).
174. See supra Part II.A..
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providers. Though the benefits of renewable energy are spread
widely, the cost of integrating those resources will be focused
solely on the generators bringing the energy to market. The
distribution of the costs of the Response Service will have an
important impact on the ability of renewable energy to
compete with other resources. FERC should more carefully
consider where these costs are placed.
C.

Creation of a More Liquid Market for Reserve Generation

The policies in the Proposed Rule do provide some direction
to system operators and generators to move ahead with
renewable integration, but it leaves out an important piece of
the puzzle. Even if FERC does choose to go forward with the
new Response Service, the Commission has failed on its own
terms to provide a proper pricing mechanism for the service.
FERC rejected Puget’s following service proposal because of
the reliance on a hypothetical proxy-generating unit for
pricing. However, Puget chose to use a proxy for pricing in part
because there was, “no existing liquid market for the flexible
capacity in the region.”175
1.

FERC should continue to pursue virtual balancing
authorities

FERC should encourage the creation of liquid local and
regional markets for flexible capacity. Liquid markets would
allow competitive pricing for ancillary services. It would also
address the shortcomings of Puget’s following service proposal
by providing a reliable baseline upon which to base the service
charge. Creating these markets is more easily said than done.
In the Notice of Inquiry leading up to FERC’s Proposed
Rule, the Commission asked for feedback on creation of a
“virtual balancing authority” (virtual BA).176 Though not fully
developed, the concept would allow VERs across a large
geographic area to virtually combine into a single BA required
to meet the NERC reliability standards. While FERC left the
concept open to the interpretation of stakeholders, the virtual

175. Puget Rejection, supra note 78, ¶ 33.
176. Integration of Variable Energy Resources, Notice of Inquiry, 130 FERC ¶ 61,053,
¶ 33 (Jan. 21, 2010) available at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/IDMWS/nvcommon/
NVViewer.asp?Doc=12249929:0.
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BA concept presumably allows aggregated renewable
generators to offset their own variability. Several comments to
the Notice of Inquiry endorsed the general concept of
aggregating variable resources as a positive potential
measure.177 It is argued that the creation of such a virtual BA
may not require additional authorization from FERC so long
as NERC reliability requirements are met.178 Regardless,
explicit endorsement and a regulatory roadmap from FERC
would further encourage the creation of these virtual BAs.
In the current proposed rule from FERC there is no mention
of a virtual BA, and FERC seems to have abandoned attempts
to expand or create more liquid markets for variable energy
resources. The hurdles for setting up such a BA are
substantial, but not insurmountable.179 To begin the process, a
significant number of generators would need to agree on terms
and proceed with establishing a BA. Such a BA would still be
subject to NERC reliability standards and would need to
procure balancing resources to moderate variability across the
virtual BA. Allowing more renewable resources to balance each
other could reduce the overall need for balancing resources
ultimately reducing integration costs.
2.

FERC must focus on new ways to create liquid markets for
renewable resources and ancillary services

In seeking comment about the viability of a virtual BA for
VERs, FERC asked the wrong question. FERC rejected Puget’s
proposal in part because the proposed following cost was not
based on any functioning liquid market for flexible capacity or
ancillary services. With that, FERC’s inquiry should focus on
the creation of a liquid market for ancillary services such as
the proposed Response Service to ensure that such services are
properly priced.180 Creation of virtual balancing authorities for
variable resources may also benefit renewables but will not

177. See, e.g., WECC Response, supra note 161, at 9 (with all other factors being
equal, larger balancing authorities are better equipped to reduce variability by
aggregating variable resources).
178. See Carol Opartny & Malcolm McLellan, Power System Balancing Authority
Innovation, 1 WASH. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2011).
179. Id.
180. See AWEA Comments, supra note 162, at 54-55 (discussing the benefit of
region-wide load following markets and ancillary services markets).
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necessarily stimulate a robust ancillary services market.181
Functioning markets for ancillary services address the
immediate problem of properly pricing the services to avoid
discrimination against the generators forced to buy them.
As an alternative to ancillary service markets, FERC’s
Proposed Rule does allow variable resources the option of “selfsupply” by entering bi-lateral contracts with generators to
provide ancillary services.182 This does hold the potential to
create a secondary market for ancillary services in places
where there is sufficient market demand. However, basing the
market on bilateral contracting will inherently restrict the
markets liquidity and does not encourage efficient use of
resources. This first step towards an ancillary service market
does not go far enough.
FERC should attempt to meet its own demands by proposing
policies to create unconstrained liquid ancillary service
markets and increase access to these markets. This can be
done by creating virtual BAs made up instead of peaker power
plants able to provide ancillary services more easily across a
wider region. In addition, FERC can make it easier for
renewable generators and other balancing resources to form
their own BAs and allowing them to negotiate their own costs
for balancing services. Other market participants are likely to
provide additional ideas as well.
In the Proposed Rule, FERC failed to initiate a serious
discussion of measures to create liquid ancillary services. As a
result, no consensus exists around the universe of options for
achieving such markets. FERC must focus new regulatory
efforts on creation of liquid ancillary service markets to
properly and competitively price the overall integration of
renewable energy.
VII. CONCLUSION
Since the adoption of Order No. 890 in 2007, renewable
VERs have continued to grow placing additional strains on
transmission providers to manage the variability. FERC’s
Proposed Rule to remove barriers to the growth of renewable
181. See Kirby, supra note 52 (virtual balancing authorities may actually reduce the
overall demand for ancillary services by allowing the renewable resources themselves
to perform some of the balancing).
182. FERC Proposed Rule, supra note 8, ¶ 89.
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energy resources acknowledge this growing problem.183 The
requirement of intra-hourly scheduling represents a significant
cost savings for the integration of renewable energy into
electric transmission systems.
By requiring compatible intervals for intra-hour scheduling,
FERC can further increase cooperation across BA boundaries.
However, the proposal to add additional ancillary service
charges for renewable generators should be reevaluated.
Charging renewable generators for the cost of integration does
not acknowledge that the benefits of renewable energy are
spread broadly. Integration costs should not be shouldered
solely by the generators and FERC should investigate ways to
spread these costs more evenly.
Finally, FERC should not abandon attempts to create more
robust market options for variable renewable resources and
the ancillary services required to balance variability.
Endorsing the self-supply option is a small first step to
creating more robust markets for ancillary services. However,
FERC must look further into the future; as renewable energy
generation continues to increase, so will the need to manage
resource variability. Robust liquid markets in both variable
renewable resources and ancillary services will represent a
significant improvement in the long-term viability of
renewable energy resources.

183. Id. at Summary.
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